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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the present tax structure, many of the tax benefits that are
available to the stockholder-employee are denied to the sole proprietor
and the partner-employee. The reason for this is that in the stockholder-
employee situation, there are two separate taxable entities, the stock-
holder and the corporation, both of which are subject to taxation on
income.' It is the absence of this buffer of a separate taxpaying entity
which is said to justify the denial to the sole proprietor and the partner-
employee of the same tax prerogatives that the shareholder-employee
enjoys. One of these prerogatives is the Section 119 "convenience of the
employer" exclusion. A recent decision,2 however, has used Section 707
of the partnership tax laws8 to elevate the partner-employee to the same
favorable tax position as the shareholder-employee, with respect to the
Section 119 exclusion. This paper will consider the status of the partner-
employee insofar as the "convenience of the employer" exclusion is con-
cerned, and also the effect of Section 707 upon that status.
II. BACKGROUND
The 1939 Code, for the most part, completely ignored the many
transactions between a partnership and its partners. It has been sug-
gested that perhaps one reason for this is that the partnership has never
been treated for tax purposes as a separate taxable entity, its annual
return merely serving as a means for determining the taxable income of
its members.4
* Member of Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.01 (1957).
2. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).
3. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 707.
4. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 354 (1968).
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Owing to this dearth of statutory authority prior to the 1954
Code, responsibility for guidance in this area was left to the courts. The
decisions, however, were inconsistent. Some courts adopted an aggregate
approach, holding that to the extent of his interest in the partnership, a
partner dealing with the partnership is dealing with himself. Other
courts took an "entity" approach, holding that transactions between a
partnership and a partner were to be treated as occurring between the
partnership and an outsider.5
There was one area, however, where the concept of the partnership
as an aggregate of individuals was uniformly adopted. The case law in-
terpreting the 1939 Code made it clear that a partner could not be an
employee of his partnership for any purpose,' including the "con-
venience of the employer" exclusion, which is now codified as Section
119 of the 1954 Code. 7 Section 119, which permits an employee to ex-
clude from gross income the value of certain meals and lodging furnished
by his employer, provides as follows:
Sec. 119. MEALS OR LODGING FURNISHED FOR THE
CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER.
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee
the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his em-
ployer for the convenience of the employer, but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on
the business premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to
accept such lodging on the business premises of
his employer as a condition of his employment.
In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished for the
convenience of the employer, the provisions of an employment
contract or of a State statute fixing terms of employment shall
not be determinative of whether the meals or lodging are in-
tended as compensation.8
Prior to 1954 there was no statutory provision comparable to Section
119, however, the "convenience of the employer" exclusion has been
expressed in Treasury Regulations and Rulings since 1919. 9
In the cases arising under the 1939 Code it was the position of four
5. See 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 35.01 (1957).
6. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. See Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Moran,
236 F.2d 595 (8th Cir, 1956); United States v. Briggs, 238 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1956);
Commissioner v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1959). But see the dissenting opinions
in the Robinson and Doak cases, and also the lower court opinions which were reversed
in all four cases: Robinson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 65 (1958) ; Briggs v. United States,
56-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 9164 (D.C. Colo. 1956) (not officially reported); Moran v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C.M. 813 (1955); Doak v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 569 (1955).
8. INT. REV. CODE § 119.
9. See Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 33 (1919); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-(3) (1939).
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courts of appeals,'" in accord with the published position of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue," that since the type of personal or living
expenses involved must be incurred by everyone, regardless of business
requirements, the exclusionary rule in question, expressly limited to em-
ployees,' 2 could not be extended to partners or proprietors. The basis
for this position was the "aggregate" theory of the partnership; that is,
the "convenience of the employer" exclusion was held to pertain only to
a situation where the employer and the employee are separate taxable
entities. It has "no relevancy where the one furnishing meals and lodging
is the same taxpayer receiving them.""
In 1954 the partnership provisions of the Code underwent a major
revision. Under the 1954 Code, as was true with its predecessor, the
basic notion of the partnership as merely an information reporter rather
than a taxable entity remains intact. 4 However, express recognition was
also given by Congress to the "entity" concept of the partnership in
several specific areas,' 5 one of which involves transactions between a
partner and the partnership. Section 707 of the Code adopts an "entity"
theory of the partnership by providing that as a general proposition, a
transaction between a partner and the partnership is to be regarded as
occurring between the partnership and a third person, where the partner
engages in the transaction other than in his capacity as a member of such
partnership.
III. RECENT DEPARTuRE-Armstrong v. Phinney
The Code does not attempt to define the scope of Section 707, nor
does it explain the relationship between that section and other sections of
the Code. A recent decision, however, has relied upon Section 707 as
authority for departing from the prior concept that a partner cannot be
an employee of his partnership for purposes of the Section 119 exclusion.
In Armstrong v. Phinney,'6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with
the question of whether the "convenience of the employer" exclusion is
available to a managing partner of a partnership engaged in the business
of cattle ranching, where the partner's meals and lodging were furnished
10. See cases cited supra note 7.
11. Rev. Rul. 80, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 62.
12. See INT. REV. CODE § 119.
13. Commissioner v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1956).
14. This fact is clearly stated in both 1954 Code Committee Reports:
Because of the vital need for clarification, your committee has undertaken the first
comprehensive statutory treatment of partners and partnerships in the history of
the income tax laws ...
In general, the proposed statutory treatment retains the existing scheme of regard-
ing the partnership as merely an income-reporting, and not a taxable, entity. ...
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
89 (1954).
15. See J. CHOMmiE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 356 (1968).
16. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).
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by the partnership. In reversing the district court's action of granting
summary judgment for the government, the court ruled that in enacting
Section 707(a), Congress had rejected the "aggregate" theory of part-
nerships in favor of the "entity" theory in "cases where a partner sells
property to or performs services for the partnership,"1 7 and in the light
of the provisions of Section 707, the government was "not entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."'
In arriving at its decision, the court noted that under the provisions
of Section 707, a partner who performs services for the partnership is
treated as an "outsider" or as "one who is not a partner," when he is
not acting in his capacity as a partner. 9 After having recognized this
express limitation on the scope of the section, however, the court made no
attempt to discuss when a partner who performs services for his partner-
ship is acting within its provisions. Rather, the court merely went on to
conclude that while the Code did not explain the relationship between
Section 707 and the other sections of the Code,
we have found nothing to indicate that Congress intended that
this section is not to relate to Section 119. Consequently, it is
now possible for a partner to stand in any one of a number of
relationships with his partnership, including those of creditor-
debtor, vendor-vendee, and employer-employee."°
From the reasoning employed in this case, one is led to the logical
conclusion that in the view of the court, the taxpayer fell within the
purview of Section 707(a) solely because he was rendering services to
his partnership. This, in effect, is a holding that every partner who per-
forms services for his partnership (other than in return for guaranteed
payments)' is automatically acting in a capacity other than a partner
within the meaning of Section 707(a).
This apparent holding in Armstrong is important for several rea-
sons. Aside from the fact that such a construction of Section 707 repre-
sents a fundamental departure from established principles of partnership
law,22 the number of partners similarly situated with the taxpayer in the
Armstrong case will obviously make for substantial administrative rami-
fications. Also, there is the distinct possibility that a court employing the
same reasoning as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will have little
difficulty in making available to the partner-employee all of those tax
benefits accompanying the status of "employee" that heretofore have
been denied him. The question for consideration, then, is whether by
17. Id. at 663.
18. Id. at 664.
19. Id. at 663.
20. Id. at 663-664 (emphasis supplied).
21. The problem of "guaranteed payments" is dealt with in Section 707(c).
22. To wit: that a partner cannot be an employee of his partnership for any purpose,
including the Section 119 exclusion. See discussion infra at page 784.
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enacting Section 707 (a) Congress intended to provide statutory recogni-
tion for the type of relationship involved in the Armstrong case.
IV. SECTION 707(a)
A. Partner Acting in Capacity as a Partner
The court in Armstrong was quite correct in observing that in 1954
Congress
rejected the "aggregate theory" in favor of the "entity theory"
in cases where "a partner sells property to, or performs serv-
ices for the partnership. '2
However, as is clearly stated in both the Code and the Regulations,
this result will be forthcoming only if the partner is engaging in any of
these transactions with his partnership "other than in his capacity as a
member of such partnership. '24 That is, "Section 707 (a) is not applicable
to transactions which involve the partner in his role as partner."25 Ac-
cordingly, in order to properly apply Section 707(a), it becomes neces-
sary to distinguish transactions in which a partner is not acting in his
capacity as a member of the partnership from those in which he is so
acting.26 While the Code does not consider the problem separately it is
submitted that the proper rules to be utilized lie in the considerations
that follow.
B. Specific Considerations
Whether a partnership's business consists of the performance of
services for clients or the selling of goods to customers, the general
partner will very often perform services for the partnership as a normal
and integral part of the business of the partnership. For example, X, a
partner in the XYZ accounting firm, is clearly acting in his capacity as a
partner when, in accordance with the partnership agreement, he earns
income for his partnership by auditing the books of one of his firm's
clients. Indeed, the same is true of any partner, who, pursuant to his
partnership agreement, performs the various activities which constitute
the business of the partnership. Restated, a partner who contributes to
the business activities of the partnership by performing functions that
are an integral part of the normal conduct of the partnership business
would appear to be acting in his capacity as a partner. 7 While such
23. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
24. See § 707(a), Treas. Reg. § 1.707.1 (1956).
25. See 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 35.24 (1957).
26. Id.
27. There may be instances, however, where a partner will perform services for his
partnership in the capacity of a non-partner. Suppose that partner X contracts with XYZ
to build a new set of bookshelves for the firm's conference room. In this case, he would
be acting other than as a member of the partnership.
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activities may fall within Section 707 (c),2 they are not covered under
Section 707(a). If, on the other hand, the interpretation that the Fifth
Circuit has apparently given to the section is what Congress really in-
tended, one would expect to find some mention of it in the legislative
history. Yet, as the court in Armstrong pointed out,2" this is not the case.
In fact, the contrary appears to be true. The Conference Report on H.R.
8300 points out quite clearly that the use of the "entity" approach in
the treatment of transactions between a partner and a partnership cannot
be considered a recognition by Congress of the validity of considering
the partnership as an entity in all situations.30
Armstrong is the first reported case decided under the 1954 Code
that has dealt with the interrelationship between the Section 119 exclu-
sion and Section 707.81 However, one circuit, in the case of Foster v.
United States,82 has already indicated that it would rule contra to the
holding in Armstrong should the opportunity present itself. In Foster a
partner, while acting within the scope of his normal duties as a member of
the partnership, provided management consulting services for a client of
the partnership in Saudi Arabia. The partner claimed that the payments
he received for his services were covered under Section 707(c) and were
therefore excludable under Section 119. The court found that "there was
no evidence to support the contention that the payments were to bear no
relationship to partnership income," 8 and, therefore, the payments were
not guaranteed within the meaning of Section 707 (c). What is significant
here, however, is a statement of the court concerning the possible appli-
cation of Section 707(a). The court said:
There is no basis for any contention that the plaintiff was not
acting in his capacity as partner in Saudi Arabia so as to render
applicable Section 707 (a) .... 4
C. Conclusion
Whether a partner-employee is performing services for his partner-
ship in a capacity other than as a member of the partnership must be de-
28. If a partner receives as compensation for his services a fixed salary that is deter-
mined without regard to the income of the partnership, then he would come under the
provisions of Section 707(c). See discussion of Section 707(c) infra at 785.
29. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. No inference is intended, however, that a partnership is to be considered as a
separate entity for purposes of applying other provisions of the internal revenue
laws if the concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more appro-
priate for such provisions.
H. CONFR. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954).
31. The only other case decided under the 1954 Code that has considered the question
of whether a partner could avail himself of the Section 119 exclusion is Wilson v. United
States, 376 F.2d 280 (Ct. Cl. 1967), in which it was held that he could not do so. How-
ever, the court in Wilson did not consider the applicability or the effect of § 707. This
fact Was noted by the court in Armstrong. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d at 664, n.9.
32. 221 F. Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affirmed on other grounds, 329 F.2d 717
(2d Cir. 1964). See also Foster v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 974, 978 (1964).
33. Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
34. Id.
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termined according to the facts of each individual case. However, based
on the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that under no circumstances
should a partner who performs services as a normal incident of his duties
as a member of the partnership be considered as falling under the "en-
tity" concept of Section 707(a).
V. SECTION 707(c)
A. Unique Interpretation
The holding in Armstrong was grounded upon Section 707 (a). How-
ever, the court intimated", that the identical result could have been
reached under subsection (c) of the same section.80
Section 707 (c) provides that payments for services or for the use of
capital, computed without regard to the income of the partnership, shall
be treated as if paid to a non-partner.3 7 However, Section 707(c) "guar-
anteed" payments are treated as payments to non-partners "only for the
purposes of Section 6 1(a) (relating to gross income) and Section 162 (a)
(relating to trade or business expenses). 's For purposes of the other
provisions of the Code, they are regarded as a partner's distributive
share of ordinary income. 9 The effect of this limitation is to prevent
a partner from qualifying as an employee for purposes of the Section
105 (d) sick pay exclusion, and also to prevent him from qualifying for
purposes of contributions to a pension or profit-sharing plan.4 °
Whether or not a payment is "guaranteed" within the meaning of
Section 707(c) is primarily a factual inquiry.41 The test for determining
guaranteed payments is whether they are payable without regard to the
income of the partnership, and in making this determination, the sub-
stance rather than the form of the transaction is to govern.42
In the Armstrong case, the government had argued that the emolu-
ments received by the taxpayer were determined without regard to the
income of the partnership, and that, therefore, Section 707(c) rather
than Section 707(a) should govern the outcome of the case and prevent
any exclusion from gross income under Section 119.41 In rejecting the
35. See Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 664 n, 10 (5th Cir. 1968).
36. NT. REV. CODE § 707(c) provides as follows:
(c) GUARANTEED PAYMENTS. To the extent determined without regard
to the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use
of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the part-
nership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross income and
section 162 (a) (relating to trade or business expenses).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c).
40. Id.
41. F.A. Falconer v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 1011, 1015 (1963).
42. Id.
43. It should be noted in passing that we have considered and rejected the govern-
ment's contention, first raised on oral argument, that section 707(c) governs this
case.
Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 664, n. 10 (5th Cir. 1968).
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government's contention, the court expressed the view that even if the
emoluments furnished the partner were covered under Section 707(c),
the outcome would remain unchanged, since coverage for purposes of
Section 61(a), to which Section 707(c) is expressly limited, should be
construed as incorporating the other sections of Subtitle A of the Code."
This unique interpretation of Section 707 (c), suggested by way of
dictum in the Armstrong case, raises two important points for consider-
ation: (1) are the Section 119 emoluments "guaranteed payments" under
Section 707(c); and (2) was the reference in Section 707(c) to Section
61(a) intended to incorporate by reference the remaining sections of
Subtitle A?
B. Guaranteed Payments
Before Section 707(c) becomes operative, two requirements must be
satisfied: (1) the partner must receive a guaranteed payment, and (2)
that payment must be determined without regard to the income of the
partnership." The problem here is with the first of these two require-
ments: is the value of meals and lodging furnished to the partner-
employee a "guaranteed payment" within the meaning of Section 707 (c) ?
It seems only logical that in situations where a partner-employee
has his meals and lodging taken care of by the partnership, the value
of these emoluments is as much a part of the partner's salary as any cash
payments he may receive, so that to the extent that his right to receive
such compensation is not dependent upon partnership income, it would
constitute a guaranteed payment under Section 707 (c). 6 But, as a close
look at the wording of this section and at its legislative history indicates,
another interpretation is also possible.
The use of the phrase "guaranteed payment" indicates literally a
fixed or predetermined cash amount, such as a salary or an annuity. In
both of the committee reports on Section 707(c) the term "guaranteed
salary" is used synonymously with the term "guaranteed payment."4 '
Therefore, it becomes arguable that had Congress intended to include the
value of meals and lodging within the purview of Section 707(c), the
term "guaranteed compensation," "guaranteed income," or a similar
more inclusive term than "guaranteed payment" would have been used.
Perhaps, then, Section 707(c) was intended to cover only cash payments
44. Under section 707(c) such "payments to a partner for services .. . shall be
considered as made to one who is not a member of the partnership .. .for the
purpose of section 61(a). . . ." (emphasis added.) Section 61(a) defines gross
income as "all income from whatever source derived," but with the proviso "except
as otherwise provided in this subtitle.' 26 U.S.C.A. § 61(a). Thus section 61(a)
incorporates the other sections of the subtitle including section 119, and requires
that the other provisions of the subtitle be considered and utilized in determining
gross income.... Id.
45. See INT. Rim. CoDE § 707(c).
46. See F.A. Falconer v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 1011, 1015-1016 (1963).
47. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954).
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for salaries and interest on capital, and not such expenditures as the cost
of meals and lodging furnished to a partner-employee for the convenience
of the partnership.
The court in Armstrong did not deal directly with the precise ques-
tion now under consideration. From its discussion of the sub-section, how-
ever, it seems the court considered the value of meals and lodging as
falling under the statute.48 Moreover, a statement made by the court con-
cerning the requirements necessary before the value of these emoluments
could fall under Section 707(c) has placed an additional uncertainty
upon this problem of characterization. In discussing the interrelationship
of Section 707(c) and Section 119, the court said:
There is no evidence in the record that the emoluments were
"determined without regard to the income of the partnership"
or that they consisted of "payments" rather than lodging and
meals furnished in kind. Furthermore, even should evidence be
produced on remand showing that these two requirements for
the application of section 707(c) are present, such evidence
would not affect the result in this case."9
Precisely what the court meant by this language, which apparently
restricts the application of Section 707(c) to "payments" rather than
"meals and lodging furnished in kind," is not at all clear. There are
conceivably two methods available to the partnership for providing a
partner with the value of meals and lodging: (1) The partner-employee
can pay for the expenses himself and later be reimbursed by cash pay-
ments from the partnership; (2) The meals and lodging can be furnished
directly (in kind) by the partnership to the partner. It is unlikely that the
court's intention could have been to draw a distinction between these
two methods for the purpose of restricting Section 707(c) to the "reim-
bursement" situation. The reason for this is as follows: Section 119 is
almost uniformly considered to apply only where the value of meals and
lodging is furnished "in kind."5 0 Therefore, it seems doubtful that the
court would make an initial determination that Section 119 emoluments
are "guaranteed payments," and then restrict the application of Section
707(c) to a situation which would render the initial characterization
meaningless.
Perhaps by restricting the application of 707(c) to "payments,"
the court intended to adopt the narrow interpretation of that section as
encompassing only fixed cash payments to a partner.5' However, this also
appears unlikely, and for almost the indentical reason as in the previous
alternative considered above. To say that only cash payments may qual-
ify under Section 707(c), after having initially decided that the value of
48. See Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 664, n.10 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
50. See 2 P.1-., FEDERAL TAXES § 8687 (1969).
51. See discussion infra at 25.
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these emoluments are "guaranteed payments," would be to allow form
to govern over substance.
C. Problem oj Incorporation
As has already been pointed out, the Regulations expressly provide
that for purposes of provisions of the Code other than Sections 61(a)
and 162 (a), guaranteed payments are to be treated as distributive shares
of partnership income, with the effect of this limitation being to prevent
a partner from qualifying for the Section 105 (d) sick-pay exclusion and
the Section 404 deferred compensation deductions. 52 It would appear,
then, that since Section 119 stands in the same general category as Sec-
tion 105(d)-in that they both provide for exclusions from the gross
income of employees-the same result should apply to Section 119.
The court in Armstrong, however, reached an opposite conclusion by
reasoning that the reference in Section 707(c) to Section 61(a) should
be construed as incorporating the other sections of Subtitle A of the Code,
including Section 119.11 In arriving at this result, the court relied en-
tirely upon the words in Section 61 (a), "[E] xcept as otherwise provided
in this subtitle . . . . 14 It hardly needs pointing out that if the above
expression is to be treated as being included in the reference in Section
707 (c) to Section 61 (a) then, logically, it should apply with equal weight
to all of the provisions of Subtitle A; not only Section 119, but also Sec-
tions 105(d) and 404. But, as has already been noted, the latter two
Sections are mentioned in the Regulations as specific examples of non-
applicable provisions under Section 707(c).11 If the construction sug-
gested by the Armstrong case is correct, then to the extent that they
conflict the Regulations must be considered invalid. It is a well-established
rule of construction, however, that in interpreting tax statutes, the Reg-
ulations are to carry great weight and have the force of law unless clearly
in conflict with the terms and purposes of the statute to which they re-
late. 6 Therefore, unless the legislative history discloses such a "clear
conflict," the applicable provisions of the Regulations should play at
least some part in interpreting the scope of Section 707(c).
1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 707(c)
The original version of Section 707(c) as contained in the 1954
House Bill provided as follows:
(c) Guaranteed Salaries.-For purposes of section 61(a)
(1) (relating to the inclusion in gross income of compensation
52. See infra at 20.
53. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661, 664, n.10 (5th Cir. 1968).
54. Id.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1956).
56. Commissioner v. South Texas Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); United States v,
Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-307 (1967).
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for services, etc.) and section 162 (a) (1) (relating to the deduc-
tion of expenses for a reasonable allowance for salaries, etc.),
payments to a partner for services shall, to the extent deter-
mined without regard to the income of the partnership, be con-
sidered as a salary paid or incurred with respect to one who is
not a member of the partnership.5 7
As is readily apparent, this original version contained the same latent
ambiguity as does the present revised version now under consideration.
In fact, this ambiguity was called to the attention of the Senate Commit-
tee on Finance on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by a representa-
tive of the American Institute of Accountants:
[I] t should be made clear whether the imputed compensation
[under Section 707 (c)] is to be treated as such for purposes of
the withholding tax, unemployment-compensation tax, social
security tax, pension and profit-sharing plans, etc.58
With minor revisions, the House version of Section 707(c) was
approved by the Senate, and this revised form was subsequently enacted
into law. In commenting upon the revisions it made, the Senate Finance
Committee's Report explained:
When a partner . . . performs services for the partner-
ship, the problem arises whether the transaction is to be treated
[by adopting the entity approach or the aggregate approach]
... . Because of its simplicity of operation, the "entity" rule
has been adopted by -the House and your committee.
Under present law, fixed payments to a partner are not recog-
nized as a salary but considered as a distributive share of part-
nership earnings. This creates obvious difficulties where the
partnership earnings are insufficient to meet the salary. The
existing approach has been to treat the fixed salary in such
years as a withdrawal of capital, taxable to the extent that the
withdrawal is made from the capital of other partners. Such
treatment is unrealistic and unnecessarily complicated. The
House bill provides that payment of a fixed or guaranteed
amount for services is to be treated as salary income -to the re-
cipient and allowed as a business deduction to the partnership.
As indicated below, your committee makes slight changes ...
In the case of guaranteed salary payments your committee
followed the House bill but made it clear that such income is
to be reported for tax purposes at the end of the partnership
year in which it is paid and that this treatment is only provided
for purposes of the reporting of the income by the partner and
the deducting of the payments by the partnership. .... 59
57. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (emphasis supplied).
58. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Finance on The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 83d Cong, 2d Sess. 1322 (1954).
59. S. Ra. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954) (emphasis supplied).
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Prior to the 1954 Code, certain complications and uncertainties had
arisen in connection with the income of a partner and the corresponding
business deduction of the partnership, where the partner transacted
business with his partnership as an outsider. These problems were due
to the fact that a guaranteed salary could be considered either as a
distributive share of partnership income or as income earned by the
partner as an outsider, depending upon whether the "aggregate" or
"entity" theory of the partnership was adopted.6"
Perhaps, then, as the Senate Committee Report seems to indicate,
the "entity" theory of the partnership was provided for in Section 707 (c)
only because it was simpler than the "aggregate" theory for dealing with
the income-computing and timing problems discussed above. Had the
Report gone on to provide explicitly that the guaranteed payments in
their entirety were to be included in the recipient-partner's gross income,
then such an interpretation of Section 707(c) would appear to be con-
clusive. However, this is not the case. The Report stated that the entity
treatment was being provided "only" for the "reporting" of the income by
the recipient partner." The use of the word "reporting" opens the door
for a construction coinciding with that in the Armstrong case, since the
word "reporting" can be interpreted as including a predetermination as
to whether a given item of income is taxable or non-taxable. A statement
contained in the Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means
also supports this latter view.62
Nowhere in the legislative history of Section 707(c) is the subject
of the value of meals and lodging furnished to a partner-employee dealt
with directly. Nor is it possible to infer from the Committe Reports
with any degree of certainty that the Congressional intent in enacting
Section 707(c) was to treat a partner-employee like any other employee
for purposes of determining whether a payment is includible in, or ex-
cludable from, the partner's gross income. Perhaps, then, all that can be
said regarding the reference in Section 707(c) to Section 61(a) is that
it is ambiguous.
2. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 707 (c)
If it is true that the statute itself and its supporting history are
unclear on the issue of incorporation, then this would seem to be precisely
the situation for which the Regulations were designed. Yet, in Armstrong,
60. See Benjamin v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 139 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944); Wegener v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 49
(5th Cir. 1941), certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 643 (1941). Stout v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.
1199 (1959).
61. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954).
62.. The Report states:
A partner who renders services to the partnership for a fixed salary, payable
without regard to partnership income, shall be treated to the extent of such amount
like any other employee who is not a partner.... (Emphasis supplied.)
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A226 (1954).
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the validity of the pertinent provisions of the Regulations was not even
considered.
It is submitted that before any court adopts an interpretation of
707(c) that would allow incorporation, the validity of the Regulations
must be considered; and unless found to be in clear conflict with the
underlying purposes of the statute, they should operate to prevent in-
corporation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The different tax treatment accorded essentially similar businesses,
depending upon their legal form of organization, has been characterized
as "a striking and inequitable feature of the present law."63 Without
going into the criticisms of the existing scheme, suffice it to say that a
construction of Section 707 that would remove the present distinctions
insofar as the partner-employee is concerned would not serve to remove
the existing "inequities." Rather, it would only serve to create new ones.
Taxpayers operating their business as a partnership would thereby be
given a tax advantage over a similarly situated sole-proprietor who clearly
cannot take advantage of provisions such as Section 119. The partner-
employee would also gain a tax advantage over the shareholder-employee,
since in the latter case both the shareholder-employee and his corporation
would still be required to pay income tax. It is submitted that Section 707
was not intended to remove the well-established rule that a partner is
not an employee of his own partnership for the purpose of applying the
"convenience of the employer" exclusion now codified in Section 119 of
the Code.
63. 100 CONG. REC. 8998 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin).
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